![]() After all, Google has implemented an entire operating system with web frameworks in Chrome OS, so is making the installer a web app really that much of a stretch? But what makes ’s installer so interesting is that the web interface isn’t limited to just the local machine, it can be accessed by any browser on the network. Now that alone wouldn’t be particularly groundbreaking. Once the user has booted into the live OS, they simply need to point the browser to the loopback address at any time to access the installer’s GUI. In an effort to make the installation of FreeBSD a bit more user friendly, the new installer does away with the classic terminal interface and fully embraces the modern web-centric design paradigm. Of course, that doesn’t mean there isn’t room for improvement.Īmong the long list of projects detailed in FreeBSD’s April to June 2021 Status Report is a brief update on an experimental installer developed by. In a broad sense you could say most OS installers require more clicking than typing these days, but on the whole, not a lot has really changed. While the medium may have evolved from floppy disks to DVDs and USB flash drives, the overall process of installing an operating system onto a desktop computer has been more or less the same since the 1980s. Finally, after six months of trying to inform Jacuzzi and SmartTub of their severe security issues, both admin portals were secured.Ĭontinue reading “This Week In Security: IoT In The Hot Tub, App Double Fail, And FreeBSD BadBeacon” → Posted in Hackaday Columns, News, Security Hacks, Slider Tagged BadBeacon, freebsd, IoT, openssl, This Week in Security Their solution was to pull the plug on one of the two URL endpoints. ![]() Exasperated, he finally turned to Auth0, asking them to intervene. And after details were supplied, complete radio silence. SmartTub didn’t have a security contact, but an email to their support email address did elicit a reply asking for details. The real problem started when he tried to disclose the vulnerability. This was enough to demonstrate the flaw, and making changes would be flirting with that dangerous line that separates research from computer crime. ![]() This approach seems to gain admin access to all of the SmartTub admin controls, though didn’t try actually making changes to see if he had write access, too. Rewrite the response so the front-end believes you’re an admin, and you’re in. What would happen if the response from Auth0 were modified? There are a few approaches to accomplish this, but he opted to use Fiddler. It appears that the limitations to data is all implemented on the client side, and the backend only requires a valid access token for data requests. However, we already know that some real data gets loaded. If the logged in user isn’t an admin, the redirect happens. The page sends that access token right back to the Auth0 service to get user privileges. The page uses the Auth0 service to handle logins, and that service sends back an access token. Could that have been real data that was unintentionally sent? A screen recorder answered that question, revealing that there was indeed a table loaded up with valid-looking data.ĭigging around in the page’s JavaScript comes up with the login flow. “Unauthorized” Well that’s not surprising, but what was very odd was the flash of a dashboard that appeared just before the authorization complaint. The page presented a login prompt, so punched in the credentials he had just generated. In this case, the registration email came from smarttub.io, so it was natural to pull up that URL in a web browser to see what was there. Because as we all know, in IoT, the S stands for security. He didn’t realize he was about to discover a nightmare of security problems. Purchased a Jacuzzi hot tub, and splurged for the SmartTub add-on, which connects the whirlpool to the internet so you can control temperature, lights, etc from afar.
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